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ABSTRACT PAGE

This thesis is concerned with the “Glorious” English Revolution (1688-89) and
the American Revolution (1776-83) and the propaganda o f each movement. It discusses
the early portions o f each revolution and the initial propagandistic strategies employed by
its revolutionaries and applies a comparative approach. In particular, it focuses upon the
leaders and figureheads o f each revolution and their role in the propaganda campaigns
that sought to legitimize their revolts. One prominent individual from each movement
and one important event which the individuals participated in form the crux of the study.
These individuals and events were chosen for the rough correlation they share to one
another in placement and importance in their revolutions. For the Glorious Revolution, I
have considered William III and his landing at Torbay in November 1688, while for the
American Revolution I have considered George Washington and his entrance into
Cambridge, Massachusetts in July 1775.
The goal o f this essay is to explore how both William and Washington, and those
who supported them, attempted to legitimize themselves in the periods immediately
preceding and following these events. It thoroughly examines various forms of
revolutionary propaganda including declarations, pamphlets, sermons, petitions, letters,
and public speeches. In so doing it exposes many intriguing similarities and differences
between William, Washington, and their use o f propaganda which I believe speak to the
larger similarities and differences in general between these two revolutions. Ultimately,
my thesis argues that both Washington and William not only supported the propaganda
campaigns o f their revolutions but in some cases personally crafted persuasive documents
for public consumption. It concludes that these actions greatly helped the revolutionaries
legitimize themselves and contributed to the somewhat inaccurate understandings o f
these men and their revolutions which have persisted throughout history and continue to
influence us today.
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I. Introduction

Traditionally, revolution has been used to attempt to bring about fundamental
changes in political structures, usually in response to some form of social or political
breakdown. These attempts at change have been met with both positive and negative,
violent and relatively peaceful, results. Often the success or failure of a revolutionary
movement is dependent upon winning the support of the populace. If a considerable
number of “the people” do not support the revolutionaries and their arguments for the
necessity of change, it will be very difficult for any new government to legitimize itself
and gain long term stability, and the revolutionaries will most likely fail. In order to
influence the beliefs of the populace, the ideas of the revolutionaries must be clearly and
effectively stated in some form and then presented to the people so that the message of
the revolution can be properly disseminated. Without the successful spread of a
revolutionary ideology the people will most likely be distrustful of change and will
oppose or remain ambivalent to it. Thus, the key to the successful transformation of the
organizational or power structures of a government in a revolution is the achievement of
‘legitimization through the effective use of persuasion or, as it is more often called,
propaganda.
Propaganda has recently been defined as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to
shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that
furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.” 1 It has been used by legitimate
governments and revolutionary powers alike as a way to influence public opinion, often

1 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
1999), 269.
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through the “reinforcement of cultural myths and stereotypes.”2 Often these myths are so
deeply engrained within a society and their effectiveness so widespread that the
identification of a message as a propagandistic one can be difficult.
With these points in mind, there are many questions about the nature of
propaganda and legitimization in revolution. Why exactly do some revolutions, even
those armed with the most persuasive arguments for change, fail while others succeed?
What particular forms of argumentation have proven to be the most effective in
revolutions? Are all forms of political persuasion in revolution to be considered
propaganda? Do different types of revolutionaries, fighting for very different things,
attempt to legitimize themselves with the same kind of propaganda? In what way does the
propaganda of legitimization change as the circumstances of the revolution itself change?
It is with these questions in mind that this essay will attempt to further understand
the issues of propaganda and legitimization in revolution by examining and comparing a
pair of specific historical moments from two revolutionary movements. The two
revolutions I will examine are the “Glorious” English Revolution (1688-89) and the
American Revolution (1776-83). The two moments from these revolutions that I will
study are, respectively, the periods immediately preceding and following the landing of
William of Orange at Torbay in November 1688 and the arrival of General George
Washington in Cambridge, Massachusetts in July 1775.
I have chosen these two particular revolutions because of the unique similarities
and differences that they exhibit. Both the Glorious Revolution and the American
Revolution are popularly remembered today with a certain rosy-minded admiration. An
extraordinary sense o f national pride seems to be connected to these movements, lending
2 Ibid.
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them an almost mythical status. This allows many people to look beyond the complicated
and sometimes chaotic elements of the events in order to see only clear-cut and
reaffirming examples of the ostensible “greatness” of the American and British political
experiments.
Additionally, both movements stand apart as somewhat unusual examples of
revolution. Following the original early modem understanding of the term, these
“revolutions” were labeled as such because they represented a “return” to older principles
rather than a radical “rebirth” featuring new ideas. As a result, in comparison to the far
more radical and explosive sociopolitical experiments of the Russian (1917) or Chinese
(1946-49) Revolutions, these movements appear far more conservative. In many ways,
the Glorious Revolution was not very “revolutionary,” in so far as those with power and
influence in English society (the elite landowners and the mling dynasty itself) remained
in power. While there may have been a new person (or in this case new persons) on the
throne there were no fundamental economic or social changes that accompanied the
movement.3 And while the American Revolution certainly had its share of “radical”
moments, it was also nevertheless largely devoid of the kinds of chaos exhibited by other
revolutionary movements. No kings were publicly executed, the governmental structure
of the colonies did not break down into disorder or anarchy, and the economic conditions,
while hardly prosperous, remained relatively stable. I believe these distinctive features
encourage further comparison between the revolutions.
To be fair, however, there are many differences between these two revolutions.
They are separated by more than a hundred years and took place in very different

3 Dale Hoak, The World o f William and Mary: Anglo-Dutch Perspectives on the Revolution o f 1688-89
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1996), 12.
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political climates, for strikingly different reasons and with very different results. These
differences may complicate a comparison of these movements, especially if one were to
consider both revolutions in their entirety. As a result, for the purposes of this essay, I
have made the decision to limit my study to two particular portions of the revolutions, or
more precisely, to the actions of two influential individuals during two periods of great
risk and uncertainty. I believe these figures and events that I have chosen roughly
correlate to one another in terms of their relative importance and their general placement
in the revolutions and are thus worthy of comparison.
Both William’s landing at Torbay and Washington’s entrance into Cambridge
stand apart as crucial turning points that occurred fairly early on in the movements. Both
William and Washington had been placed in precarious situations from which they no
longer had the power to extricate themselves. Both had now committed themselves to
their revolutions and were indelibly linked with them so much so that the failure of the
revolution would have resulted in the destruction of the leaders. It is also important to
note that at the time of these events, both Washington and William lacked any formal,
legal justification for their actions. While William was formally “invited” by a group of
English nobles to invade and did have an outside claim to the throne, his actions were
effectively a coup d ’etat: a forceful seizure of power from a legitimate monarch. The
Prince of Orange still needed to convince a large segment of the English population,
common and noble alike, of the purity and justification of his actions both before and
after Torbay. Washington, while formally appointed Commander-in-chief by the
Continental Congress and held in very high esteem by many patriots, was technically a
rebellious commander of a rogue army. By July of 1775, the colonies were effectively in

rebellion, with blood having already been spilt at the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and
Bunker Hill, while the Continental Congress (the only source of Washington’s legal
legitimacy) was not yet recognized as a genuine governmental body by anyone outside
the colonies. The Americans had not even declared their independence and were quite far
from obtaining any kind of real unity.
Additionally, I believe Washington and William themselves are worthy of
comparison. Both were strong military and political leaders, the heroes and figureheads
of their movements, responsible for leading their forces to victory against great odds and
under intense pressure. Both were first and foremost soldiers. William had been fighting
in Europe against the forces of Louis XIV for all of his adult life and considered his
actions in England to be another part of his great war against the spread of Catholic
absolutism. Washington, a veteran of the Seven Years War, had been professionally
trained by the British army and was able to secure his commission as commander-inchief in large part because of his extensive military background.
Furthermore, both men actively generated propaganda in order to support their
actions. William pursued a series of aggressive propaganda campaigns in order not only
to make the case to his own people of the immediate need for an invasion of England but
also to the English people before and after his landing. This campaign included the
extensive use of declarations and pamphlets as well as politically charged sermons
delivered by those loyal to his efforts such as Gilbert Burnet. Washington played a
similar game, participating in a well-crafted propaganda campaign with the Continental
Congress in order to gain support for their young cause. This included the creation of
several declarations and other mass produced and direct appeals to the populace.

6

Additionally, Washington’s personal letters, his general use of language, and the nature
of his arguments for American Independence suggest that he was at least somewhat
complicit in the great war o f words which ensued among Patriots and Loyalists in the
colonies.
A discussion of these matters, however, also invites a discussion of the role
played by the larger bodies of government which were irrevocably tied to these two
revolutionaries throughout their struggles. After all, no one person can legitimize a
revolution single-handedly. A propaganda campaign, especially during a revolution, is a
concerted effort on the part of many individuals and while the great leaders or hero
figures may assume the spotlight in such a campaign, they are not the only ones
responsible for the dissemination of a revolutionary ideology. William of Orange and
George Washington would have been powerless to enact real change in their revolutions
were it not for the support of the British parliament and the American Continental
Congress. Thus these bodies of government must also be considered part of our
discussion.
In summary, the goal of this essay will be to compare these revolutions and the
revolutionaries who were able to legitimize themselves during them. Specifically, it will
explore how the propagandistic tactics used by both William and Washington, and the
larger bodies of government supporting them, attempted to legitimize themselves in the
periods immediately preceding and following two important sets of events. My focus will
be upon the various forms of propaganda employed by American and English
revolutionaries, including official declarations, pamphlets, and sermons as well as
personal letters and other correspondence. With an eye for the explicit language using by

7

the propagandists, I will compare the arguments William, Washington, and those around
them used to support themselves. Thematically, I will look for similar concepts which run
through the propaganda of each revolution including religion, natural rights and the
rejection of absolutism, appealing to the masses (through both the spoken and the printed
word), the use o f military force, and the use of direct, personal attacks. In the end, I
believe the similarities and differences between the two events will speak to the larger,
general similarities and differences between the two revolutions.

8

II. The Build-up to Revolution

The events leading up to the Glorious and American Revolutions, and the role
played by George Washington and William of Orange in them, are complicated and
require a brief but thorough introduction in order to be properly understood. This section
will provide that introduction before a more detailed discussion of the propaganda
surrounding Washington, William, Cambridge, and Torbay follows.
** *

The causes and effects of the Glorious Revolution and William Ill’s place in it
must be understood within their proper European context. The events of 1688 and 1689
were as much a Dutch as an English affair and the influence of other forces from the
continent cannot be ignored.4
In the years before the invasion, the Prince of Orange pursued an aggressive
foreign policy of opposition to and containment of the great menace of late seventeenthcentury Europe: Louis XIV of France. As a stadholder and an influential member of one
of the most powerful families in the Seven Provinces, William engaged in a series of
conflicts (namely the Franco-Dutch War) with the French king and his allies throughout
the 1670’s and 1680’s. The purpose of these wars was to stem the territorial and thereby
the religious expansion of Catholic France into the Protestant Netherlands. While
William was largely successful in these respects, forcing the French to withdraw from
most of Dutch territory, Louis nevertheless made other considerable gains in the region
while forcing the Dutch to exhaust a great deal of their money and resources in the

4 Ibid.
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process. Despite various periods of peace and attempts at reconciliation between the
warring powers, such as the Treaty of Nijmegen of 1678, William remained firmly
convinced of Louis’ desire to conquer the whole of Europe and rule it as an absolute
Catholic monarch.5 In an ever precarious diplomatic position, the prince thus engaged in
a series of political maneuvers, in anticipation of further conflict, in order to strengthen
his ability to defy the French. The most important of these maneuvers involved England
which William, contrary to the opinions of many in the Dutch political community,
would come to believe possessed.a vital and, as of yet, unexploited military potential.6
By marrying into the English royal family and increasing his visibility among the
English people, the Prince of Orange began to become more familiar with the country’s
internal politics. This familiarity, in time, enabled William to assert himself as a popular,
potential successor to the embattled Charles II and later James II. Despite this, however,
the prince’s life goal was never to become the king of England.7 Desiring “a change in
policy, not a change in monarch,” the prince saw the throne as a means to an end more
than it was anything else; a tool with which he planned to bring England, with its
o

powerful army and navy, into an anti-French alliance. It was only later, after James’
attempted flight and the outbreak of near chaotic mob violence in London and other
cities, that William would decide that a deliberate seizure of the throne was the best way
to ensure that his objectives were met.9 While the subsequent Whig historiography paints
William as the consummate “Protestant deliverer” and praises his efforts to save England

5 John Miller, The Glorious Revolution (London; New York: Longman, 1983), 11.
6 Hoak, 23.
7 Ibid., 21.
8 Robert Beddard, “The Unexpected Whig Revolution o f 1688” in The Revolutions o f 1688: The Andrew
Browning Lectures, 1988, ed. Robert Beddard, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 13.
9 Ibid., 14.
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from “popery and arbitrary power” the prince was primarily motivated to invade and
indeed conquer James’ throne by strategic considerations.10 While religion was indeed a
vital issue, William’s dynastic interests in England, advanced by his marriage and
political maneuvering, must be understood as part of his so-called “grand strategy” to
contain Louis XIV.
As William maneuvered, the political situation in England grew increasingly
tumultuous. Rising to the throne in February 1685, King James II, almost immediately
began alienating a great number of his people. Criticized by Whig and Tory alike for its
absolutism and “popery” James’ regime was widely unpopular but remained very far
from collapse.11 It was clear to many that without outside assistance there would be little
chance of removing the king from power. Despite these developments William still
lacked both the appropriate opportunity as well as the support to effectively implement
his ambitious plans for England. This began to change, however, beginning in the early
1680’s as a result of a number of complicated and intertwined events.
In 1682, Louis once again renewed his hostilities by attacking the Spanish
Netherlands, placing the neighboring Dutch province of Holland in jeopardy. Three years
later, as part of his larger crusade against Protestants in his own country, the French king
revoked the Edict of Nantes, which for nearly a hundred years had guaranteed religious
toleration to all Huguenots. This bold move, which sent shockwaves throughout all the
courts of Europe, also resulted in an unprecedented flight of wealthy French protestants,
leaving France robbed of a great deal of potential capital and economic expertise.

12

To

offset these losses, beginning in August of 1687, Louis reimposed the tariffs and duties
10 Hoak, 23.
11 Miller, 10.
12 Hoak, 25.

which he had earlier placed upon imports from the Dutch Republic up until the Treaty of
Nijmegen. This action in turn set off a Franco-Dutch commercial war, once again
arousing fears within the Seven Provinces of further French military action in the
Netherlands. On the heels of these developments, word arrived in December of that year
that Mary of Modena, James IT s queen, was pregnant with their first child. Many at
James’ court optimistically announced that Mary would soon give birth to a son who
would be raised a Catholic and come to surpass William in the line of succession.
This series of chance events, arriving in relatively quick succession, convinced
William and his fellow Burgomasters that swift and direct action was needed.
Successfully playing upon the increased fears of his countrymen William secured
unprecedented support for his bold “grand strategy.” Armed with this new mandate, the
prince engaged in a bold propaganda campaign with the goal of legitimizing his plans to
invade England and gain control of its government.

While the Glorious Revolution must be seen as a distinctly European conflict, the
American Revolution must be appreciated as a transatlantic event, fought principally
between two increasingly different parts of a large and unwieldy colonial empire. The
revolution undoubtedly had its European elements. Continental powers, especially the
French, had a vested interest in the revolution and ultimately gave their support to the
colonial cause in order to subvert the imperial efforts of their rivals. In addition, the
British, because of concerns of a Bourbon Alliance invasion of their homeland and the
defense of their interests in the West Indies, were never able to concentrate all of their
resources on the conflict. Nevertheless, at its core, the revolution was an internal struggle

12

between two groups of English subjects with differing opinions as to the nature of
sovereignty with regards to a particular portion o f British territory. Thus, despite its
European aspects, the American Revolution must be understood as more of an internal
British-colonial or “American” event than anything else.
Following its victory in the Seven Years War (1754-1763), Great Britain chose to
drastically redefine its relationship with its American colonies. Motivated in part by the
massive debt incurred from the war and the daunting cost o f maintaining permanent
garrisons in North America in order to combat French, Spanish, or Native American
incursions, government ministers adopted a decidedly more “imperial” posture. As a
result, the mother country began exercising a more centralized form of administrative
control over its dependencies than ever before.13
With a series of new tax initiatives, beginning with the Sugar Act (1764) and the
Stamp Act (1765), the British government sought to increase both its direct revenue from
and its influence in the colonies. These taxes were met with a great deal of resistance by
many colonials. Before these acts there had been no direct interference by the British
Parliament in colonial affairs with the exception of a modest, and largely evaded,
collection of Navigation Acts.14 This detachment had bred a spirit of autonomy and selfgovernment in the colonies resulting in the development of a series of “mature, stable,
social, and political institutions controlled by indigenous local elites.”15 With the selfsufficiency of these institutions seemingly now endangered and without elected
representation in the British Parliament, many colonials began to feel that their individual

13 Daniel Marston, The American Revolution, 1774-1783 (New York: Routledge, 2003) 9; Francis D.
Cogliano, Revolutionary America, 1763-1815: A Political History (New York: Routledge, 2000), 25.
14 Marston, The American Revolution, 1774-1783, 9.
15 Cogliano, 25.

13

rights and liberties, as British ^citizens, were being threatened. These concerns only
intensified following the passage of other, similar taxes including The Quartering Act
(1765), The Townshend Revenue Act (1767) and later the Tea Act (1773) and the
Coercive Acts (1774). In response, the colonials embarked upon a kind of ideological
journey which, beginning as a defense of their traditional autonomy, would later
culminate in a full declaration of American sovereignty and independence from Great
Britain.16
Among the more initially obscure figures in this tumult was a Colonel in the
Virginia colonial militia named George Washington. A wealthy planter and British
trained veteran of the Seven Years War, Washington had remained politically aloof in the
early years of the struggle. However, following Parliament’s increasingly obtrusive
actions, the Colonel soon came to prominence as an active and powerful member of a
rising group of outspoken elite patriots. In time, Washington would earn the respect of
many within the Virginia political community and beyond, building an impressive
reputation and eventually becoming, arguably, the most powerful individual in colonial
America.
Eventually the sentiments of patriots like Washington began to take hold in many
Americans resulting in a widespread popular call for colonial unification. Ultimately
these developments would culminate in the development of an intercolonial,
representative convention which would serve as a new forum for collective colonial selfexpression and protest. Beginning with the First Continental Congress of 1774 and
continuing with the Second Continental Congress a year later, these conventions began
growing in power and prominence, increasingly taking on the roles normally reserved for
16 Cogliano, 23,
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a legal administrative body. As the direct control of the king and his parliament over the
colonies began to disintegrate, the Congress continued to evolve, ultimately growing
“into the institution that served as the central government for a new American state
through eight years of war and five years of uneasy peace.”

17

Despite the rapid growth of the Congress’ authority, its delegates often quarreled
among themselves. The divisions among the representatives reflected those of a diverse
populace, threatening the concept of colonial unity. From an early period, however, one
basic idea united the leaders of the colonies: the wisdom of their commander-in-chief.
From the moment of his election as the supreme leader of the united colonial army,
Washington, being perceived as a leader of credibility and skill, remained consistently
supported by the majority of the Congress. This support allowed the General’s
preferences to be translated into action, giving him a profound amount o f political
influence.

1 fl

In time, this allowed the General and the Congress, working together, to

influence colonial public opinion through a series of propagandistic acts, leading many
Americans to support the legitimacy of the new colonial government and its
independence movement.

17 Jerrilyn Greene Marston, King and Congress: The Transfer o f Political Legitimacy, 1774-1776
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987), 67-68.
18 Ibid., 133.
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III. Propaganda and Revolution

Propaganda figured heavily in both the Glorious Revolution and the American
Revolution. Through a series of both direct and indirect means, English, Dutch and
American revolutionaries were able to successfully present their ideologies among the
general populations, resulting in the broad dissemination of their message and the
eventual legitimization of their revolutionary governments. Many elements of these
revolutions and their propaganda campaigns are dissimilar. The nature of the goals of the
revolutionaries, their relationship vis-a-vis their opponents and the authority structures of
their governments and propaganda campaigns are all strikingly different. Despite these
distinctions, however, there are a number of important correlations between the symbolic,
propagandists figureheads of the movements, the types of propaganda used by the
revolutionaries, and the specific tactics and language used in the propaganda. This section
will detail these differences and similarities and discuss what they suggest about the
larger movements and the individuals involved in them.

Fundamental Differences

Any comparison of the propaganda of the Glorious Revolution and the American
Revolution must acknowledge several fundamental differences between the revolutions
and their propaganda campaigns. The Glorious revolutionaries were chiefly motivated by
political and especially religious concerns. Displeased by the policies enacted by James II
(policies that were often influenced by the sovereign’s faith) a group of foreigners, aided

16

by Englishmen loyal to their cause, decided to forcibly change England’s political and
religious situation for their own benefit. Their movement was justified by a lawful claim
to the English throne which William o f Orange possessed as well as a mandate, granted
to the prince by a group o f high ranking English politicians (speaking ostensibly on
behalf o f the English people), which he believed entitled him to invade and later to usurp
the kingship. As a result, William and his supporters must primarily be seen more as
invaders or perhaps more kindly as foreign deliverers. While they were more or less
welcomed by the English the fact remains that they chose consciously to involve
themselves in an external political and religious situation that did not directly concern
them. They generally should not be considered internal rebels or insurgents.
The American revolutionaries were motivated by political and in particular
ideological concerns. Their quarrel with King George, their self-acknowledged sovereign,
was not a religious one and instead principally involved the concept of representation in
government according to a radical Whig understanding of the English Constitution.
Offended by the political policies enacted by Parliament and the king and desirous to
have a more prominent voice in the development of the laws which governed them, the
delegates of the Continental Congress used a variety of different methods to attempt to
convince the British government to redress their grievances. Ultimately, the
revolutionaries felt they had little choice but to use armed force to rebel against British
control and form their own independent government so that they could defend their rights
and liberties themselves. There was little legal precedent for this and colonists justified
their actions philosophically. Consequently, the Congress and its leaders such as George
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Washington, must be classified as rebels, insurgents or insurrectionists; leaders of a
revolt that began from inside rather than outside the British Empire.
The goals at the outset o f each movement, and the ways in which the
revolutionaries were prepared to attain them, were also very different. William of Orange
invaded England to take over its government and reduce its king to a pawn and he had no
compunction about using military force to do this. After restoring the Protestant faith to
the English people he then planned to compel their government to join an alliance against
Louis XIV and go to war against him. In contrast, the Continental Congress, at first,
hoped to settle its dispute with King George using peaceful measures. Most colonists
very much desired to remain a part of the British Empire and as a result were initially
unwilling to renounce their allegiance to it. Thus, the Continental Congress can be seen
as a group of somewhat reluctant revolutionaries. Furthermore, many congressmen
questioned their legal ability to raise an army, appoint generals and wage war.
Finally, the leadership structure of these revolutions and their propaganda
campaigns were also strikingly dissimilar. For all intents and purposes, the Glorious
Revolution was the revolution of William of Orange. While other leaders such as
William’s wife, Mary had a vested interest in the movement and ancillary figures such as
Gilbert Burnet and Gaspel Fagel were instrumental in the crafting of the movement’s
propagandistic messages and helping the prince implement his ambitious plans, William,
more so than any other individual, was the architect and the director of the uprising. He
alone was able to navigate the bureaucratic minefields that complicated the politics of the
Seven Provinces and England and he alone was able to act as an influential symbol for
the movement.

18

In comparison, the American Revolution was a far more decentralized and
democratic event. No single individual was able to dictate the actions of the revolution at
a national level and control the content of the movement’s propaganda. Instead, the
Continental Congress was largely responsible for organizing the colonial response in as
unified a way as it could. While many influential pieces of propaganda such as Thomas
Paine’s Common Sense were released independent of the Congress, the body brought
together “many of the more able propagandists in the colonies” and accordingly became
the source of “the most important political agency for the spreading of ideas.”19 While
individuals such as General Washington exercised a certain amount of powerful, semi
centralized control over the movement, no one colonist was ever able to act in the same
capacity as a European prince.
These distinctions are important and complicate a comparison of the events to a
certain extent. Nevertheless, despite the fundamental differences between them, the
Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution and the propaganda of each movement
share some surprising similarities.

William and Washington

Both revolutions boast prominent figureheads, who despite exercising differing
degrees of power in their movements, acted as remarkably effective propaganda symbols
that embodied the core principles of their revolutions.

19 Philip Davidson, Propaganda and the American Revolution, 1763-1783 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The
University o f North Carolina Press, 1941), 354.
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William of Orange was seen to exemplify the values of the Glorious Revolution
in many ways. Recognized throughout Europe as a consummate protestant man of war,
William had spent the better part of his adult life using military force to defend his
country in a series of religious wars.

on

Having stemmed the tide of Louis XIV’s

incursions into the Protestant Netherlands, William’s expertise as a commander was held
in high regard. Additionally, throughout his career, and especially during his invasion of
England, the prince displayed a bold, risk-taking resolve which made the prospect of
facing him in battle a daunting one.21 Finally, William’s well documented hatred for
“popery” made his status as a faithful and fervent Protestant beyond reproach. These
factors made William the perfect individual to rescue the English people from the
damaging policies of an absolutist Catholic king who despite his unpopularity remained
•

very powerful and, to all outward appearances, very capable of defending his crown

22

and

unwilling to give up his faith. The British Parliament admitted this much in their
declaration of December 11, 1688, by referring to the Prince of Orange as a man who
“with so great kindness to these nations, so vast experience, and so much hazard to his
own person, hath undertaken.. .to rescue u s.. .from the imminent dangers of popery and
slavery.”23
In a similar way, George Washington appeared to constantly epitomize the
principles of the America Revolution. In a movement which ideologically dedicated itself
to virtuousness and the defense of the principles of English republicanism, no man was

20 Hoak, 6.
21 Ibid., 20.
22 Ibid., 19.
23 A Declaration o f the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, In and About the Cities o f London and Westminster,
Assem bled at Guildhall (December 11, 1688), ed. Robert Beddard, in A Kingdom without a King: The
Journal o f the Provisional Government in the Revolution o f 1688 (Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1988), 71-72.
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held in higher esteem or more celebrated as the model of the virtuous republican
gentleman than the commander-in-chief.24 The General’s ostensible dedication to “the
greater good,” is well documented as he refused to receive a salary for his work as the
commander of the Continental Army and later chose to resign his powerful command to
retire to his estate. Additionally, his skill as a veteran o f the Seven Years War was well
established. Arguably the most experienced officer in the colonies at the time of his
nomination, Washington was praised by John Adams during the Second Continental
Congress as a “gentlemen” whose “skill and experience as an officer...is very well
known to all of us.”25 Thus, no one was better suited to defend the territory of the
colonies on the battlefield while also defending its principles against reproach through the
quality of his character.
The fact that these two men so perfectly embodied their revolutions is no
accident. It is a testament to the power of the propaganda machines that supported them
and their own willingness to personally use and otherwise support their movement’s
propaganda iii order to appear as committed to the principles of their movements as they
could.
William of Orange, the main director of the Glorious Revolution’s propaganda
campaign, understandably used indoctrination extensively throughout the movement to
craft the way that he would be perceived by those around him. His attention to his
reputation as well as the way that his invasion and his subsequent seizure of the throne
would be received by the English people is evident throughout the propaganda created

24 Gordon Wood, “The Greatness o f George Washington” in G eorge Washington Reconsidered, ed. Don
Higgonbotham (Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia, 2001), 314.
25 Edward G. Lengel, This Glorious Struggle: George Washington’s Revolutionary War Letters (New
York: HarperCollins, 2007), 3-4.
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not only by William himself but also by his supporters which he often directly
supervised. William constantly choreographed his appearance in order to not only appear
virtuous in English eyes but also, when possible, to evoke appropriate religious or
historical imagery.26 One such example of this involves William’s decision to time his
landing at Torbay in such a way that landfall was made on November 5th, the anniversary
of the Gunpowder Plot, a date which carried incredible significance to English
protestants. In addition, William, a man “capable of the greatest dissimulation” often had
no problem deceitfully using propaganda to cloak his actions.

For example, following

the birth of the Prince of Wales, only months before his invasion, William sent a
congratulatory letter to his father-in-law praising the miraculous nature of the birth.
Considering the fact that many within England and the Seven Provinces (including
William’s wife) strongly doubted the legitimacy of the birth and that it would based upon
this suspicion that the prince would later launch his invasion, the nature of his letter is
immediately suspicious. Whatever the intention of the letter, William’s actions angered
many of his supporters. The Invitation to William from the “Immortal Seven” which
would follow shortly thereafter in fact directly chastised the prince for his
correspondence. Stating that the document “hath done you some injury” the invitation
warned that the topic was a delicate one which the prince should handle with more care
because “the false imposing of [the birth] upon the princess and the nation” was “not only
an infinite exasperation of people's minds here” but was also “certainly one of the chief
causes upon which the declaration of your entering the kingdom in a hostile manner must

26 Lisa Jardine, Going Dutch: How England Plundered Holland's Glory (New York: Harper, 2008), 16.
27 Hoak, 22.
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be founded on your part.”28 In the end, I believe few if any historians question William’s
deeply rooted role in the propaganda o f the Glorious Revolution and the more
unscrupulous character traits which his involvement in that campaign reveal.
For George Washington, however, the situation is more complicated. To the best
of our understanding, Washington does not appear to have acted as a stereotypical
revolutionary propagandist. While some of his actions and their purposes may be
challenged and a hidden set of his guarded true intentions may be surmised, the fact
remains that George Washington does not appear to have carried on his role as a
figurehead of the American Revolution in the same kind of duplicitous fashion as a figure
like William of Orange. This may in part be due to the fact that the more decentralized
authority structure of the American Revolution made it far more difficult for a figure such
as the commander-in-chief to control the presentation of his public image using
propaganda. Thus, to a certain extent, Washington did not have the same opportunity to
engage in deception that a figure such as William of Orange did. Despite this, however,
Washington’s character still in many ways appears to be above serious reproach.
If one desires proof of this fact, they need only look at the scene surrounding his
initial assumption of command as the leader of the Continental Army. Using evidence
collected from several sources it is the almost unanimous opinion of today’s scholars that
Washington did not actively seek the commission of Command-in-Chief. His assumption
of power was apparently entirely unexpected and undesired.
When he was first nominated for the position by John Adams in a session of the
Continental Congress on June 14, 1775, Washington reportedly fled the chamber
28 The Invitation to William (June 30, 1688), ed. Andrew Browning, in English Historical Documents,
1660-1714 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1953), 120-122.
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immediately.

90

His subsequent speech of acceptance two days later was remarkably

gracious. The Virginian repeatedly stated his thanks to the Congress and noted the great
honor which had been done to him. The new general also stated repeatedly and “with the
utmost sincerity” that he did not believe he was worthy of the command he was being
offered.30 His acceptance of it he declared was due only to the importance and greatness
of the cause which the revolutionaries were struggling for. Finally, he stated that in order
to assure the Congress that no “pecuniary consideration” influenced him to accept his
new position, he would not accept a salary.
Washington’s personal letters to his wife also appear to suggest that his new
position was one that he not only did not desire but also sought to evade. Assuring
Martha “in the most solemn manner” the General writes that “so far from seeking this
appointment I have used every endeavor in my power to avoid it, not only from my
• 31
unwillingness.. .but from a consciousness of its being too great for my capacity.”
Additionally, Washington relates that despite reluctance “it was utterly out of my power
to refuse this appointment without exposing my character to such censures as would have
reflected dishonor upon myself, and given pain to my friends.” Making his uneasiness
and unhappiness clear, it appears that the new commander-in-chief is as unassuming as
he possibly could be under the circumstances.
Further support is provided by Washington’s friends and colleagues such as
Patrick Henry who relates to us the General’s behavior on the day of his acceptance of

29 Edward G. Lengel, General George Washington: A Military Life (New York: Random House, 2007), 88.
30 George Washington, Address to the Continental Congress (June 16, 1775), ed. Philander D. Chase et al,
in The Papers o f George Washington: Revolutionary War Series, 18 vols. to date (Charlottesville:
University Press o f Virginia, 1985), 1:1.
31 George Washington to Martha Washington (June 18, 1775), ed. Philander D. Chase et al, in The Papers
o f George Washington: Revolutionary War Series, 18 vols. to date (Charlottesville: University Press o f
Virginia, 1985), 1:3-5.
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the position of commander-in-chief. According to Henry, Washington was highly
distressed and overcome with tears and reportedly told his friend and fellow Virginian
that “From the day I enter upon the command of the American armies, I date my fall, and
the ruin of my reputation.”32
Despite this evidence, however, a number o f facts appear to belie some of these
statements made by Washington. Examining the evidence, I believe it is possible, at the
very least, to suggest that a more complicated and calculated individual may lie behind
the public image of the General that continues to flourish even today. For the fact remains
that despite all his modesty and selflessness, Washington was still able to become an
influential propaganda symbol and a powerful symbolic figurehead of the American
revolutionary movement. How is this possible? It is possible because Washington
personally, actively, and successfully cultivated his public image and remained willing to
participate in and provide support for the tenuous American propaganda campaign which
the revolutionaries attempted to conduct. The extensive reputation that the General built
for himself enabled him to effectively act “as a propaganda and political asset” that “from
the very beginning greatly enhanced the American cause.”
For evidence of this it is best to further examine the circumstances surrounding
Washington’s assumption of command and his arrival in Cambridge. Throughout the
spring and summer of 1775, as the prospect of a larger war with Britain grew more and
more likely, many patriots began to search for a capable commander, loyal to the
American cause, who would be willing to offer his services. Washington, having fought
for the British with distinction in the Seven Years War, was seen by many as the ideal
32 Lengel, This Glorious Struggle, 4.
33 Carl Berger, Broadsides and Bayonets: The Propaganda War o f the American Revolution (Philadelphia:
University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1961), 217.
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man to lead a united army of colonists.34 In addition to his military credentials, the
commander’s role as a wealthy planter and delegate to the Continental Congress (a
delegate with the power to act as a unifying factor between North and South) made him
all the more enticing.
Washington was undoubtedly well aware of all this and despite the modesty
apparent in his later acceptance of the position, he very much desired to be the
Commander-in-Chief.

Many of the General’s correspondences from nearly a decade of

military service as well as seventeen years as a planter and politician expose key elements
of his personality, such as his “long standing ambition” for a successful military career.36
Some historians have noted this “ardent” personal hunger for fame which “can be
demonstrated over and over by his own words.”

The command of the American armies

afforded Washington the career and the fame which he so deeply desired while also
offering him the ability to embarrass the very same British army which had previously
-IQ

refused him promotion.

Thus, while he may not have overtly desired to command the

colonial army, he must have, at the very least, understood the enormous opportunity that
lay before him if he were successful.
Despite this Washington chose not to actively pursue the command of a colonial
army, a move which may suggest a certain degree of personal machination on his part.
Instead of directly campaigning, he took the appropriate steps to avoid any outward sign

34 Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons,
1951), 3:433; Lengel, General George Washington: A Military Life, 87.
35 William M. S. Rasmussen, George Washington: The Man Behind the Myths (Charlottesville: University
Press o f Virginia, 1999), 111.
36 Ibid.
37 W.W. Abbot, “An Uncommon Awareness o f Self: The Papers of George Washington” in George
Washington Reconsidered, ed. Don Higginbotham, (Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia, 2001),
277
38 Rasmussen, 111.
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of interest or impropriety. In so doing, Washington was working to build his closely
guarded, virtuous reputation; an attribute that he felt was the single most important key to
•

•

his attainment of any personal goal.

on

Over and over in fact, Washington’s actions reveal

that he possessed an “uncommon awareness of self,” a sense that “what he decided and
what he did, and how others perceived his decisions and deeds, always mattered.”40 This
explains why, whenever possible, the General appears as if he not only did not desire the
position of Commander-in-Chief but was actually unfit for it because of a lack of military
experience.
Thus, it was personal virtue and in particular modesty that formed the centerpiece
of Washington’s carefully crafted public persona. As a result, by doing his best to appear
as much like a virtuous republican gentleman as he could, Washington earned great
praise and would be elevated to an extremely distinguished status in the eyes of many
patriots 41 The commander’s “personal standards became a model” for others to follow,
allowing him to sustain his army through years of bitter conflict42 As time went on in
fact the General would be continually celebrated as the true embodiment of
republicanism in action and key individual who could transform the new American nation
into a “republican utopia.”43 Indeed as Thomas Jefferson would write to the commanderin-chief after the Treaty of Paris, it was the “moderation and virtue o f a single character”
that had “prevented this revolution from being closed as most others have been by a

39 Gordon Wood, “The Greatness o f George Washington” in George Washington Reconsidered, ed. Don
Higginbotham, (Charlottesville: University Press o f Virginia, 2001), 317.
40 Abbot, “An Uncommon Awareness o f Self,” 277.
41 Wood, “The Greatness o f George Washington,” 314
42 Rasmussen, 112.
43 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 145-225.
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subversion o f that liberty it was intended to establish.”44 This character to whom
Jefferson referred was undoubtedly none other than Washington. Thus, more so than any
other individual Washington was seen as an exemplary gentleman patriot who should be
emulated; and he was very aware o f this fact.45
This evidence is instructive, since in many ways Washington was not a
gentleman. He had never attended college, spoke no foreign languages, and was not an
exceptionally gifted man of letters.46 His family, while definitely part of the landed
planter gentry, was neither overly successful nor influential in government. Yet to the
best of his ability, Washington strove to look and act the part. His strict adherence to the
text Rules o f Civility and Decent Behavior in Company and Conversation, which he had
studied from an early age, was quite helpful. Additionally his quiet, courteous demeanor
was seen to command respect and exude strength.
Simply put, despite certain shortcomings, Washington successfully used written
correspondence and public action to appear virtuous among those whom he wished to
influence. This fact is made clear many times throughout the General’s life, including
during his appearance at the Second Continental Congress. Attending every session of the
Congress dressed in his blue and red British military uniform Washington, without saying
a word, demonstrated his willingness to take up arms.47 The uniform not only expressed a
willingness to fight but also reminded those present of the formidable tasks undertaken
and completed in that uniform.48 At the same time, however, the Virginian appeared to

44 Thomas Jefferson to George Washington (April 16, 1784), ed Julian P. Boyd et al, in The Papers o f
Thomas Jefferson, 17 vols. to date (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), 7:106.
45 Wood, “The Greatness o f George Washington,” 312.
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hold out hope for reconciliation by voting in favor of all measures that attempted it. Thus,
while firmly committed to the patriot cause, Washington was very careful to keep his
personal beliefs in check and therefore did not fill the statehouse with lengthy speeches.49
Instead, he silently embodied the belief that formally taking up arms with Britain should
be avoided at all costs but if one day it became unavoidable, he was ready and willing to
offer his services.
The opportunity came in the opening days of June 1775. With news of Lexington
and Concord already spreading throughout the colonies and groups of Massachusetts
militiamen gathering to combat the British in Boston, Congress at last believed that they
had no choice but to commit to an armed conflict. Upon the formal creation o f an
American army, the delegates immediately looked to Washington to be its commander
and the ambitious Virginian did not fail to take advantage of the situation.
Accepting the command, Washington wrote a group of letters to his wife
explaining his situation, met briefly with friends and supporters in the Congress and then
embarked for Cambridge with crowds of well wishers greeting him along the way. When
he arrived outside Boston and took formal command of the army his actions were widely
reported in colonial newspapers. Additionally, Washington took it upon himself to ensure
that the propaganda released by the Congress was properly distributed among his troops.
Upon the issuance of the Declaration o f the Causes and Necessity o f Taking Up Arms, the
General had the document read aloud in assembly. This tactic would be repeated
throughout the war as Washington did his part to make sure that the propagandist^
messages of the Congress were circulated properly.

49 Ibid., 85.
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Taking all this into account, I believe it is clear that Washington, ever the skillful
tactician of politics and war, must be seen as a willing participant in the American
revolutionary propaganda war. Through his actions and his words, the General not only
supported the propaganda of the war but also consciously misled those around him in
order to personally indoctrinate them. The fact remains, however, that the General
tempered his skill at playing the propaganda game with a desire to remain detached from
the unscrupulous nature of the conflict. Understanding “the necessity for encouraging the
people,” Washington knew what needed to be done in order to capture the support of the
American population for the revolutionary struggle, and “constantly recommended
pertinent opportunities to [his] literary friends.”50 Thus, he was always very careful to
control his placement and purpose in the campaign. Rather than take a role as a principal
creator of the nation’s propaganda, the General instead chose to act as a facilitator of
various revolutionary messages. This is why, while some of Washington’s widely
distributed addresses, declarations, and petitions carry a propagandistic quality, in most
cases, he had nothing to do with the formal creation of the rhetoric of America’s war of
words. Nevertheless, the commander-in-chief “on several occasions gave the
propagandists their cue and was always conscious of the need for their activity.”51 In
addition, we cannot overlook the fact that the declarations and addresses of the
Continental Congress would not have been able to have an effective impact on the
American people if it were not for George Washington. As the revolution’s key
“propaganda symbol” Washington lent credence to many of the pronouncements

50 Davidson, 351.
51 Ibid.
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Congress would make allowing their declarations and resolves to carry a greater
influence.
From all this information I believe it is clear that both William of Orange and
George Washington embodied their revolutions by conveying a dedication to the core
principles of the movements which others could see and potentially emulate. This
enabled both men to act as powerful symbolic figureheads of their revolutions. It was
made possible by the use of propaganda which allowed both men to support their
revolutions and themselves so that both the movement and its leader appeared in as
positive a way as possible.

Types and Tactics of Propaganda

In addition to the roles played by Washington and William, elements of the larger
propaganda campaigns o f these two revolutions also have important similarities. With the
help of the larger bodies of government which not only supported these leaders but also
helped craft and release a great deal of propaganda, these campaigns often used not only
the same types of propaganda (both broad, public displays of persuasion as well as more
direct, private forms) but also, in certain cases, the same tactics and the same language to
effectively disseminate their revolutionary messages to their extremely diverse audiences.
For both sets of revolutionaries the most popular form of propaganda was
undoubtedly the formal declaration. Whether issued by legislatures, prominent political
figures, private individuals, or other informally organized political groups, these
documents, often highly visible through their publication in newspapers, pamphlets and
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broadsides, or their recitation in city streets or other public places, were created
specifically for the purpose of carrying the message to as many people as possible. With
regards to this essay, the declarations directly issued or otherwise orchestrated by legal
governmental authorities, or those desiring to be considered as such, carry a special
significance.
William of Orange used declarations extensively before, after and even during his
landing at Torbay in order to announce his supposed intentions to the English people as
well as the rest of Europe. The Declaration o f the Hague (also known as the Declaration
o f Reasons) perhaps the first mass statement of William’s revolutionary message,
provides an excellent example of this. While it was originally intended to be released in
unison with the invasion, the declaration was inadvertently leaked beforehand and almost
immediately became readily available to commoners throughout England. In pamphlet
form it became “highly visible” and quite literally “everywhere” in the final month
leading up to the landing.

Thanks to William’s agents, it was translated into four

languages and was read aloud among the prince’s partisans in the streets of many major
English cities including the capital.

In addition, the document was also carried with

William on his voyage, designed to be printed off ad infinitium through the use of a
mobile printing press and a group o f printers and copywriters, brought along expressly
for the purpose.54
The prince would continue to use similar, highly visible documents to spread his
revolutionary messages as he approached London and later completed a military conquest
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of the capital. During this time, as James attempted to flee for France and mob violence
began to break out in London and other cities, William began using his pronouncements
to return order to the country. Later with the capital and a provisional government under
his control, the prince would continue to use propaganda in order to gain the favor o f the
Convention Parliament and ensure that a favorable settlement of the crisis was obtained.
In addition to William’s pronouncements, the Parliament itself also used declarations as
part of its efforts to settle the dispute between William and James during this period.
In a similar way, the Continental Congress issued a number of influential
declarations such as the Declaration and Resolves o f the First Continental Congress, the
Declaration o f the Causes and Necessity and the Declaration o f Independence in order to
attempt to influence large populations. While these pronouncements were principally part
o f a larger political dialogue between the Congress and the English Parliament and King
George, the popular power of these documents must not be underestimated. Additionally,
but to a lesser extent, General George Washington, used his prominent position as
commander-in-chief to issue influential declarations such as his Address to the
Inhabitants o f Canada which often espoused the same kinds of sentiments as the
Congress.
In addition to these formal declarations, other documents were released by both
sets of revolutionaries; documents which despite their indirect nature were still very
important for their ability to spread propagandist^ information to large audiences. These
documents included various speeches, letters and petitions made by William,
Washington, the Parliament and Congress which were initially, in one form or another,
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directed toward one particular audience, but were then widely distributed, using a
different medium, to a larger one.
It is important to note here that as we discuss the similarities among these
revolutions and their more indirect forms o f propaganda, there are also further differences
which appear. While both the American and Glorious Revolutions made use of indirect
propaganda, they did not always use exactly the same kinds. The propaganda of the
Glorious Revolution, for instance, was often transmitted through sermons, especially
those delivered by Gilbert Burnet, one of William of Orange’s greatest propaganda
agents. While sermons were undoubtedly a very big part of the American Revolution as
well, the Continental Congress and other patriot leaders did not have the power to direct
the American churches to say anything. Thus, when considering the propaganda
campaigns of these revolutions from a national level, we cannot directly compare their
sermons. Nevertheless, if we examine the content of all these various direct and indirect
forms (declarations, pamphlets, sermons, letters, speeches and petitions) together, despite
differences in their frequency, we immediately begin to see several important similarities.
First, despite the fact that the two revolutions were fought for very different
reasons, both sets of revolutionaries used propaganda to frame their conflict in religious
terms. In so doing both the English and the American revolutionaries used strikingly
similar language to reinforce their arguments.
Examining William’s Declaration o f the Hague, we can see that from the very
beginning the concept of religion was prominent in the prince’s rhetoric. In the
declaration William states that “religion, laws, and liberties” of the realm have been
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“overturned,” by the “arbitrary” actions of England’s current government.55 He elaborates
by explaining several ways that the king and in particular his counselors have broken
their promise to “maintain the Church of England as it was established by law.” Each of
these examples highlights the current government’s lack of support for the Protestant
faith and attempts to conflate that lack of support with illegality. William closes by
stating that one of the main reasons for his invasion is the “preservation of the Protestant
religion” and that he plans to “chiefly rely on the blessing of God for the success of this
our undertaking, in which we place our whole and only confidence.”
Following this work, various declarations released by William make some
reference to religion in one form or another. The prince’s Third Declaration reiterates
many of the same religious points of his first as it reaffirms William’s “fervent zeal for
the Protestant religion” and refers to his invasion (which at this point was in its more
advanced stages) as “the Blessed and Glorious Design which by the Favor of Heaven we
have so successfully begun.”56 However, one document in particular, a letter originally
written by William to the sailors of the English fleet on the eve of his invasion carried an
especially strong religious tone. The correspondence states the prince’s “hope that
almighty God will inspire you [the English sailors] with such thoughts as may facilitate
your deliverance and preserve you, your country, and your religion in all these impending
miseries.”

It then cautions the seamen that they are being “made use of only as

55 A Declaration o f His Highness William Henry, Prince o f Orange, o f the Reasons Inducing Him To
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Phaidon Press, 1988), 145-149.
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instruments to bring this nation under popery and slavery.” The letter then concludes by
listing, in its entirety, a prayer used by the Dutch fleet, translated from the Dutch into
English specifically for the document, which William’s invading force was undoubtedly
planning to use during its expedition.
As William advanced on London and Parliament began to throw their full support
behind him, so too did the Lords Spiritual and Temporal take up this religious language.
Stating that it could no longer “be silent under those calamities, wherein the popish
counsels which so long prevailed, have miserably involved these realms,” the body
affirmed its faith in the Protestant religion and promised that jt would ensure that the
religion was “supported and encouraged to the Glory o f God and the happiness of the
established government in these kingdoms.”58
Later in an effort to secure these goals and to promote peace and tranquility
throughout the capital and the city of Westminster, Parliament and later the Prince of
Orange both released declarations ordering all Catholics in those two cities to leave.
Claiming that their actions were “for the better preservation o f the peace and common
safety”59 the documents both threaten punishment for those who do not cooperate and
enlist local law enforcement in order to ensure that the new statutes are upheld.
In fact, even the more mundane declarations issued by William and the
Parliament during this period reference religion, albeit in an indirect manner. When
dealing with the proper collection of taxes the prince makes reference to “collectors,

58 A Declaration o f the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, In and About the Cities o f London and Westminster,
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receivers and officers (not being papists).”60 Likewise, when reestablishing order in the
capital William calls on “every person (not being a papist) that upon the first day of
December last was in any office or employment..

to return to work.61

However, William and his partisans most effectively used religion by taking
control of the English church and using the pulpit to broadcast a concerted religious
message. Leading this effort was Gilbert Burnet, an Anglican cleric who had served
William and his wife since 1686 as a close personal friend and spiritual counselor.62 One
of Burnet’s most important sermons was delivered on December 23, 1688, at St. James’
palace with a large audience of notable partisans in attendance including the Prince of
Orange himself. By this time, William’s successful landing at Torbay and occupation of
London had placed him in de-facto control of England and its government. Despite this
William faced several challenges. Desperate to grow beyond the rhetoric o f the
Declaration o f the Hague which by this time had been largely abandoned by the
revolutionaries, William had turned to Burnet in the hope that he could help emphasize
the religious implications of William’s appearance in England and his potential
assumption of the throne. Accordingly, the sermon is full of religious imagery and makes
many bold claims about William, his invasion and God’s role in it.
Beginning with a psalm and alluding to various pieces of scripture throughout,
Burnet is careful to call attention to the “amazing concurrence of providences” that have
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occurred surrounding William and his appearance in England.63 Stating over and over
again that the circumstances are “the Lord’s doing” Burnet points to a series of examples
of how God has intervened on England’s behalf and how these instances are very clear,
and begs the audience to see them and understand them properly as the work of God.
Among the seemingly miraculous events mentioned by Burnet are the “Protestant Wind”
which accompanied William’s landing and the “sudden and unbloody issue to which it
was so unexpectedly brought.” Referring to William as “Our Great Deliverer” and “the
instrument whom God has highly exalted in bringing about so great a work by his means”
the cleric makes it clear that William and his actions should be appreciated. His words
also subtly hint that God will continue to do wondrous things through William as time
goes on. Burnet also takes the opportunity to attack the Catholic religion and ostensibly
James II and his regime by referring to it as “a religion that dissolves faith and good
reason and gives authority both to perfidy and cruelty.” The sermon concludes by stating
that while many wondrous things have happened in the revolution, it is not yet complete
and thus, because it is God’s work, “we ought not to stop the course of it till it had had its
full effect” and let it “attain its full perfection.” In this way Burnet and William are
almost certainly alluding to William and his interest in claiming the throne, an action
which the pair hopes the people will also interpret as being part of God’s plan.
Similarly, the American revolutionaries often used religion to support their cause,
frequently stating that it had been blessed with “divine favor.”64 Documents such as the
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Declaration o f the Causes and Necessity o f Taking Up Arms, for instance, are full of
references to “the divine Author of our existence.” Asserting the colonists’ intent to go to
battle by “exerting the utmost energy of those powers which our beneficent Creator hath
graciously bestowed upon us,” the document also includes a direct invocation to the
almighty, stating that “with a humble confidence in the mercies of the supreme and
impartial Judge and Ruler of the Universe” the colonists “most devoutly implore His
divine goodness to protect us happily through this great conflict.” The Declaration o f
Independence contains comparable language as it refers to “The Laws of Nature and of
Nature’s God,” and inalienable rights endowed by a “Creator.” It states that the colonies
are “appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude o f our intentions” and
concludes by stating that the revolutionaries have resolved themselves to independence
“with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence.” Several other documents
from the Congress contain subtle religious overtones. The Declaration and Resolves o f
the First Continental Congress states that, in order to protect their “religion, laws and
liberties” from being “subverted” by the actions o f the English government, the
representatives have met in convention and issued a definitive statement of their rights.
Additionally, texts such as George Washington’s Address to the Inhabitants o f Canada
declare that the Americans are aided in the struggle by their belief that God has thus far
“smiled upon our virtuous efforts.”65
Despite its lack of centralized control and the absence of a national church, the
Continental Congress, while never able to make a concerted effort to indoctrinate the

65 George Washington, Address to the Inhabitants o f Canada (September 14, 1775), ed. Philander D. Chase
et al., in The Papers o f George Washington: Revolutionary War Series, 18 vols. to date (Charlottesville:
University Press o f Virginia, 1985), 1: 461-462.
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colonies through American churches, did attempt to use religion in other ways. For
instance, Congress and its leaders attempted to take control of the observance of certain
religious ceremonies. This included appointing “annually a day in the spring for fasting,
humiliation, and prayer, and a day in the autumn for thanks giving.”66 Additionally,
General Washington often attempted to manage and in some cases restrain the religious
activities of his troops. For example on November 5, 1775, members of the Continental
Army outside Boston engaged in a decades old tradition reserved for public expressions
of anti-Catholicism: Guy Fawkes Day. This holiday involved, among other things, a
public celebration where crowds would often burn an effigy of the pope. In his General
Order for that day, General Washington ridiculed the holiday and its practice of burning
the effigy as a “ridiculous and childish custom.” Reminding his troops of the need to
obtain “the friendship and alliance of the people o f Canada” the General stated that “at
such a juncture, and in such circumstances, to be insulting their religion, is so monstrous,
as not to be suffered or excused.”

f\1

However, most attempts to use American churches to spread revolutionary
messages were done by independent parties who remained unaffiliated with the Congress
or its leaders. One prominent example involves the so-called “Black Regiment” of
Massachusetts. This “regiment” was in fact a group o f Presbyterian, Baptist, and
Congregationalist preachers who were accused of espousing the principles of the
revolution from their pulpits. This group was first identified by Peter Oliver, a loyalist
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who chastised the clerics for taking “so active a part in the rebellion.”

Oliver states that

the group would “preach up manufactures instead of the gospel” to the point where “the
people would have rather suffered their brains to be beat out of their heads, than to have
their faith in this absurdity beat out of their brains.”69
Nevertheless, we must remember that whether orchestrated by Congress, its
supporters, or other unaffiliated groups, none of these efforts were as widespread or as
generally effective as the efforts of William of Orange and Gilbert Burnet.
In addition to their use of religion, both the Glorious and the American
revolutionaries frame their disputes using similar secular, political language as well. In
particular both propaganda campaigns often attack the improper legislative actions of
their opponents and call for the installation of more representative government policies
and the limitation of the excesses of monarchy.
On the eve of his invasion, William promised to ensure the assembly of “a free
and lawful Parliament.. .as soon as possible” and declared that he wished to impress “no
other design” upon the English people. Ostensibly shunning any interest in the crown
itself, the prince’s propaganda declares his desire to “concur in everything that may
procure the peace and happiness of the nation, which a free and lawful Parliament shall
determine.”70 After his landing William often reiterated these points by stating that he
hoped to “establish the religion, laws and liberties of those kingdoms upon such a sure
and lasting foundation, that it shall not be in the power of any prince for the future to

68 Adair, Douglass & John A. Schutz, eds., Peter O liver’s Origin and Progress o f the American Rebellion
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), 41.
69 Ibid., 63, 106.
70 Declaration o f His Highness William Henry... (October 10, 1688)

introduce popery and tyranny.”71 Later, having pledged their support to William, the
British Parliament weighed in on the issue, going so far as to restate many of the prince’s
earlier statements verbatim. Praising William for his desire to “procure a free parliament”
the representatives stated their desire to obtain “such a parliament with all speed, wherein
our laws, our liberties and properties may be secured.”72
The Continental Congress, labeling itself a “full and free representation” of the
united colonies continually stated that it had been forced to act because the rights of the
colonists as English citizens were being disrespected. In a statement of those rights, the
Congress often took it upon themselves to list those rights and expand on their nature.
The Declaration and Resolves in particular relates “that the respective colonies are
entitled to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and inestimable
privilege of being tried by their peers o f the vicinage, according to the course of that
law.”
In addition, these statements about the nature of government and the desire for
representation often included anti-monarchical language and many direct and fervent
attacks on monarchs themselves. Burnet’s sermons directly attacked James II, labeling
his actions as “abominations” which had burdened the English people.

The Parliament

likewise discredited James and his actions, in particular in their declaration issued on
February 13, 1689, a document which was released under William’s supervision. The
document listed over twenty grievances against the king and his advisors and stated that

71 By His Highness William Henry, Prince o f Orange, A Third Declaration (November 23, 1688)
72 A Declaration o f the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, In and About the Cities o f London and Westminster,
Assembled at Guildhall (December 11, 1688)
73 Gilbert Burnet, Sermon Delivered at St, Jam es’s before His Highness the Prince o f Orange (December
23, 1688).
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these acts were undertaken “to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion, and the laws
and liberties of this Kingdom.”74
Similarly, Congress chose to directly attack King George and his supposed abuses
of power, labeling his recent actions “a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all
having in direct object the establishment o f an absolute tyranny over these states.”75
Detailing this “long train of abuses and usurpations” and the “absolute despotism”
displayed by the king through them, the Congress listed over twenty detailed grievances
against their monarch. Based upon these abuses the Congress concluded that “a prince,
whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the
ruler of a free people.”
Despite these attacks and their indictment of the abuses of monarchy, each set of
revolutionaries initially displayed an unwillingness to directly attack the characters of the
monarchs they opposed. William at first refused to directly attack King James, a family
member and a sitting monarch (who was also the commander of a formidable army and
navy) and instead constantly laid the blame upon James’s “evil councilors” and their “ill
nr

designs.”

Parliament continued this trend, blaming not James but instead the influence

put upon him by “the pernicious counsels of persons ill affected to our nation and
religion.”77

74 The Declaration o f the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons Assem bled at Westminster
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Congress similarly initially avoided attacking King George and instead chose to
hold Parliament and “his Majesty’s ministers of state,”78 responsible. Much of the early
propaganda of the American Revolution in fact went out of its way to avoid direct
criticism of the sovereign. In one case, the Congress stated that “several threatening
expressions against the colonies were inserted in his majesty's speech” but refused to
openly blame the king for those comments.79 In fact, Congress actually went so far as to
directly petition George III on two occasions, lauding him as “The King’s Most Excellent
Majesty” and the “Most Gracious Sovereign,” while wishing him a “long and prosperous
reign” and kindly “beseeching” him to listen to their concerns.

QA

These similarities, I

believe, highlight the interesting parallels in the ways both groups of revolutionaries
chose to shift their propaganda strategies as the circumstances of the revolutions began to
change.
Both the Glorious and American revolutionaries also took great care with military
matters. Directly addressing the reasons impelling them to use military force and
repeatedly stating that the choice to do so was a necessary and otherwise reluctant one,
both groups were anxious to appear as passive as possible in their decision to use arms to
decide their conflicts.
While William’s appearance in England was made in an overtly military way, he
initially stated that his invasion was being implemented on behalf of the English people
and that his show of force was not meant to be used to claim the throne. Denying that his
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invasion intended “to conquer and enslave the nation,” William stated that “the forces we
have brought along with us are utterly disproportioned to that wicked design.”81 He
continued by relating that he was “confident that no person can have so hard thoughts of
87

us” and that “no true Englishman and good Protestant can entertain the least suspicion
o f our firm resolution.”83 Later the prince attempted to make the depth of his commitment
to his cause plain stating that he and his army were prepared to “spend our dearest blood
and perish in an attempt than not carry on this Blessed and Glorious design.”84 He also
continually attempted to announce the strength of his military position by explaining how
many soldiers in James’ army had “deserted the illegal service they were engaged in
and.. .come over to us.” Throughout all this, however, the prince was careful to espouse
his hope of avoiding battle and bloodshed stating that “if it be possible [to claim victory]
without the effusion of blood.. .we do think fit to declare.. .we will offer no violence to
any but in our own necessary defense.”
In a similar way, the Continental Congress stated that its decision to raise an army
and appoint a commander-in-chief was influenced by offense actions of the British
government and its army which the Congress claimed had “butchered” innocent
O c

Americans.

Throughout the war the delegates would maintain that they did not create

the Continental Army out of an overt desire to make war and conquer territory. Instead,
when faced with the option of “an unconditional submission to the tyranny of irritated
ministers, or resistance by force,” the colonists stated that they were only making the
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most practical choice that they felt was being offered to them.86 In addition, the Congress,
using strikingly similar language to that of William of Orange, stated that the colonists
stood “with one mind resolved to die freemen rather than to live slaves.” George
Washington echoed these sentiments by stating that the crisis between king and colonies
had “risen to such a height that arm alone must decide it.”87 However, Washington was
also quick to reiterate his belief that the colonists were fighting not for glory and wealth
but instead “in defense of our liberty, our property, our wives, and our. children.” The
commander-in-chief also reiterated the Congress’ commitment to the principles of the
revolution, stating, with an eerie similarity, that his troops were “prepared to preserve
them or die.”
Both sets of revolutionaries were also very quick to begin exercising direct
authority over large groups of people despite their lack of legitimacy. For the Glorious
revolutionaries, this behavior included the tactic of aiming their declarations toward the
common man and looking out for the security and safety of civilians by organizing law
enforcement and delegating authority in much the same way a centralized government
would. While the American Revolutionaries did this to a certain extent, the lack of
centralized control over the American citizens made it far more difficult for the Congress
to suppress mob violence and general disorder. Nevertheless, in the end the increased
authority given to the convention by its constituents lead the Congress to continue to
adopt many of the functions of a national government. These included maintaining an
army, appointing generals, raising money for the war effort, reserving the right to make
treaties and alliances and in general ensuring that the lives and liberties of the citizens
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were being upheld. Ultimately, these strategies would earn both sets of revolutionaries
the support of a majority of the common population and help to solidify their
revolutionary claims.
Following his invasion, and James’ exodus, William made a concerted effort to
reach out to the English people in the hope of restoring order to the now chaotic cities of
London and Westminster. At first William did this without any direct authority in the
interest of filling the power vacuum created by James’ departure. His Third Declaration
provides a good example of this as it outlines his hope that “all Lord-Lieutenants,
Deputy-Lieutenants, and Justices of the Peace, Lord-Mayors, Mayors, Sheriffs, and all
other magistrates and officers civil and military of all counties, cities and towns of
England” would continue to do their duties and help restore order.
However, later that month Parliament chose to intervene with its own declaration.
It stated that because James had “withdrawn him self’ it was now up to parliament and
William to restore order. To this end, the body pledged to “endeavor to preserve the
peace and security of these great and populous cities of London and Westminster and
parts adjacent,” and to “assist his Highness” by promoting “His Highnesses intentions for
the public good.”
Armed with this new mandate William went to work releasing a slew of
declarations aimed at earning the support of and ostensibly protecting the masses. These
documents often directly referenced Parliament’s earlier decree by stating that
representatives had “by their respective applications, desired us to take the administration
of public affairs, both civil and military and the disposal of public revenue, for the
preservation of the peace.. .and to exercise the same till the meeting of the intended
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convention.”

AO

Thus with the purpose of ensuring “the happy state and peace of the

kingdom” William went to work “suppressing all riots, routs, and tumultuous
assemblies,”89 ensuring that the public revenues would once again “run in their proper
channel” and no longer be “intermeddled with,”90 and making certain that all Catholics
and repudiated Catholics were being removed from London and Westminster.91
In a similar vein William also took care to ensure that his army was behaving
properly and that he was doing everything in his power as a military commander to keep
the peace. This included guaranteeing that no troops were “quartering in private houses”
unless they had the “free and voluntary consent of the owner”

09

and that any troops that

had been incorrectly ordered to disperse were being recalled by “Colonels and
Commanders in Chief of such regiments, troops and companies” and then kept “in good
order and discipline.”93 Since these earlier disturbances were causing “the public peace
[to be] very much disturbed,”94 the prince’s actions were met very positively by the
common people who began to throw their support behind their future king.95
Following suit was Burnet whose sermon on December 23, 1688 called on
ordinary Englishmen to “see the folly of trusting to that religion and of imagining that
any weight was to be laid on all the promises that could be made us by them.” In this way
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the sermon not only attacked James and Catholicism together but also cautioned the
English people about harboring Catholic tendencies or entertaining the thought of
opposing William and his protestant faith.
However it would not be until after the meeting of the convention and its decision
to appoint William and Mary as the joint sovereigns in March 1689 that the Prince of
Orange would gain legal legitimacy in the minds of the English people and be able to
govern beyond his original capacity as a temporary, provisional authority.
In a similar way, throughout late 1774 and into 1775 and beyond, the Continental
Congress had increasingly begun exercising a form of centralized governmental control.
Through documents such as Declaration and Resolves o f the First Continental Congress
and later the Declaration o f the Causes and Necessity o f Taking Up Arms, both widely
distributed and well received domestic propaganda, the convention began releasing
formal, unified, and intercolonial statements of their rights and grievances.
The key to effectiveness of these propagandistic documents was the First
Congress’ willingness to govern moderately and to attempt to take into account the
interests of all of their representatives and thereby all of their constituents. This was done
with respect to not only civil but also military matters. For instance, while Congress
repudiated the authority of the British Parliament and stated their intention to levy their
own taxes and represent themselves through their colonial assemblies and the national
convention,96 they continued to hold out hope for reconciliation and in so doing refused
to give into the demands of the more radical patriots. Thus through the use of relatively
moderate and often conciliatory actions, Congress was able to increase its legitimacy in

96 Bonwick, 91.

the minds of moderate and conservative Americans in every colony.97 One of the key
decisions in this phase of the conflict was the creation o f the Continental Association, a
“non-importation, non-consumption, and non-exportation agreement” among concerned
citizens, which proved Congress’ willingness to not only regulate the colonial economy
but to consider energetic yet nonviolent efforts to redress its grievances.98 Additionally,
in the interest of ensuring that the problems faced by the colonies could be adequately
dealt with beyond the end of the convention, the representatives were careful to ensure
that a second Congress would convene, picking up where the first left off. The eventual
return of all but six of the original delegates for the second session suggested an
important continuity between the two conventions which further legitimized the actions
of the representatives.99
Yet, when that Second Congress came together to continue their work seven
months later they learned that many o f their conciliatory measures had been met with
scorn by the British Government which now considered the colonies to be in a de-facto
state of rebellion. Faced with new and more serious challenges the Congress did not
reverse any of its earlier decisions or give up its authority but instead chose to adopt a
firmer stance with its opposition to the crown. This fact is evident in the increased
emphasis that the continental delegates began to place on military matters early in the
second convention; an emphasis which once again highlights the evolving nature of
Congress’ central governmental authority.
In May, the Congress directed the Provincial Congress of New York to begin the
process o f defending Manhattan through the raising of a militia and the collection of
97 Marston, King and Congress: The Transfer o f Political Legitimacy, 1774-1776, 99.
98 Bonwick, 91.
99 Ibid., 96.
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military supplies.100 The following month they agreed to assume command of the
Massachusetts Army defending Boston, immediately and ostentatiously renaming it the
Continental Army. To bolster this new national force, the delegates voted to raise more
troops from Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia for use in the defense of New England.
Additionally, the Congress authorized the use of military force to attempt to bring Canada
into an alliance against Britain. And finally as the cost of these endeavors began to
mount, the Congress authorized the printing of $2 million in paper money. All of these
actions were announced via public declarations which reached a large percentage of the
colonial population; a process which continued to cement Congress’ growing sense of
authority.
Despite these changes, however, many elements of Congress’ strategy remained
the same. Responding to the will of the colonial assemblies from each colony and their
various constituents, the delegates still remained unwilling to give up on the chance of
reconciliation and accept secession, stating that “we mean not to dissolve that union
which has so long and so happily subsisted between us.”101 In fact the Congress insisted
upon directly petitioning King George with the so-called “Olive Branch Petition,” in
hope for a resolution and reunion of British and American interests. While the document
may have angered many liberal members of Congress such as John Adams who believed
it severely compromised the colonies’ political position, the petition once again signaled
the fact that despite all of its grievances and the outbreak of open warfare in the colonies,
the Congress was not prepared to act precipitously and would therefore only explore the
concept of independence if the American people were supportive.
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However, by September, George had personally dismissed the reasoning of the
Declaration o f the Causes and Necessity o f Taking Up Arms, rejected the “Olive Branch
Petition,” and on August 23, had formally declared the colonies to be in a state of
rebellion.

1 A-}

Indeed, a series of royal proclamations and military actions would follow

over the next six months, which would influence a majority of the colonists and their
congressional representatives that independence was the only reasonable action left
available for the colonies.

1OT

Public support for independence, while initially mixed continued to grow
throughout late 1775 and early 1776, especially after the publishing of Thomas Paine’s
monumental pamphlet Common Sense in January. Advocating independence and the
ideals of English republicanism, the pamphlet is memorable for its inflammatory
antimonarchical tone and the breadth of its effectiveness. Noted historian Gordon Wood
has even gone so far as to label Paine’s work as “the most incendiary and popular
pamphlet of the entire revolutionary era.”104
Driven by the sentiments expressed by Paine and other revolutionaries,
constituents “at the local level” began instructing their congressional representatives to
push for a formal declaration of separation from Great Britain.105 The effects of this
movement were first felt at the state level as various colonies began to oust their loyally
appointed governors and other officials, replacing all signs of formalized British control.
At the national level the issue came to a head in June in the Congress as Richard Henry
Lee, following the instructions of the Virginia Convention, introduced a resolution for the
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united colonies to declare their separation from Britain. As Lee’s proposal was being
debated by the delegates, a special committee was created with the task of creating a
document that would formally proclaim the independence and explain the reasons behind
it, should the resolution be adopted.
This document, the American Declaration o f Independence written principally by
Thomas Jefferson in June 1776 and adopted and issued the following month, is in many
ways the culmination of the rhetoric of the initial phase of the American Revolution’s
propaganda campaign. In principle it represents not only the will of the American people
to obtain independence from the mother country but also their willingness to create a new
government and place the Continental Congress in control of it, at least for the time
being. One particular section of the declaration reinforces this fact. Having announced the
reasons impelling it to separate from Great Britain and stating the basic rights and
liberties of the American people, the document then states that “these United Colonies
and o f Right ought to be Free and Independent States.. .and that as Free and Independent
States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish
Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right
do ”106 This section in effect formally states that the Continental Congress has the right to
behave as a national government and in principle justifies all of its previous
governmental actions.
However, despite the success of documents such as Declaration o f Independence
and Congress’ theoretical attainment of sovereignty and legitimacy, it would take the
American revolutionaries many years before they would fully achieve all of their goals.
The sweeping claims of the declaration could not change the fact that the Continental
106 The Declaration o f Independence (July 4, 1776)
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Congress still did not represent a fully united country. Many loyalists refused to accept
the legitimacy of the body well into the 1780’s choosing to view the entire American
revolutionary movement as an unjust rebellion against King George and a deliberate
seizure of power. Still others remained undecided or ambivalent towards the issues. Even
those patriots who strongly supported the revolutionary cause would see their faith
severely tested during the next decade. Nevertheless, the monumental steps taken by the
congressmen to craft an effective propaganda campaign and use it to slowly adopt the
powers of a centralized government that was accepted by many throughout the colonies
and beyond is extremely instructive and provides us with a great deal of valuable
information with which to compare this fascinating revolution to other similar
movements. *

Conclusion

Before concluding I am compelled to note an important limitation of this study.
This section has focused on how propaganda was used during two specific periods during
these revolutions. With regard to the propaganda of the Glorious Revolution and the role
played by William III and his supporters, it has roughly considered all of the
propagandistic actions employed by the revolutionaries from autumn 1687 to spring
1689. For the American Revolution, the chapter has focused on all the propaganda
created and distributed by George Washington and the Continental Congress from the
summer of 1774 to the summer of 1776. While the discussion of these events has
provided a great deal of information about the initial steps taken by revolutionaries to
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attempt to legitimize themselves, it does not fully explain how the American or English
revolutionaries fully attained legitimacy. The reason for this omission is twofold.
First, it is often difficult to determine when a revolution is complete and when
“legitimacy” has been achieved. Though revolutionaries may declare their movements to
be a success and may physically control the territory which they wish to govern, they
may still face great resistance from inside and outside their borders. While William III
may have been crowned king in April 1689, he still faced opposition from the inhabitants
of Scotland and Ireland, many o f whom considered the deposed James to be their rightful
sovereign. Similarly, while the Continental Congress may have declared its independence
from Great Britain in the summer of 1776, the English government would not recognize
this independence until the Treaty of Paris in September 1783. Thus, at the very best, the
coronation of King William III and Queen Mary II and the Declaration of American
Independence represent only the theoretical attainment of actual political legitimacy. And
while this legitimacy is indeed important when considered as part of the larger histories
o f both countries, its nature is limited and open to dispute.
Second, as I have stated before, because of the narrow scope of this modest essay
it is far too ambitious and indeed unnecessary to attempt a complete discussion of the
propaganda of both the Glorious and American Revolutions. Instead, for the purposes of
my focused topic, I believe a discussion of the initial phases of each revolution’s
propaganda war is far more practical and indeed quite instructive. For while both sets of
revolutionaries did employ various intricate and constantly shifting propagandistic
strategies over the course of their struggle, many of their fundamental early methods
would continue throughout the conflict and would also greatly influence their later
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efforts. Thus, I believe this study of the key figures of the early moments of each
revolution and their basic propagandistic strategies has revealed a great deal about the
general nature of their larger propaganda campaigns.
As this section has shown, propaganda did indeed figure heavily in both the
Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution as both of our groups of
revolutionaries, despite various innate differences, used an assortment of sometimes
strikingly similar means to successfully disseminate their revolutionary messages,
resulting in the eventual legitimization of their revolutionary governments.
Perhaps the biggest differences between these revolutions are exposed when one
attempts to compare the initial goals of the revolutionaries and their initial reasons for
undertaking their revolts. The Glorious Revolution, from its inception, was always
designed to be secured through military force. Its goal was to capture control o f England,
its territory and its government. The American Revolution, on the other hand, was
undertaken with a certain degree of reluctance as a result of several failed attempts at
reconciliation between the English government and its colonies. Military conflict was for
a long period of time explicitly avoided while peaceful measures were employed to
attempt to end the dispute.
Other disparities can be found when one examines the authority structures of the
revolutions and their propaganda campaigns. The Glorious Revolution was William of
Orange’s revolution and-it is a movement for which he undoubtedly, willingly, and
candidly used propaganda. The American Revolution, conversely, was a far more
decentralized affair and as a result General George Washington’s role in its propaganda
was far different. Washington, unlike William, did not openly seek advancement as a
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leader of his revolution and was comparatively less involved in the development and the
spread of its propaganda.
Yet, despite these contrasts, both leaders did at the very least attempt to deceive
those around them and knowingly supported their movements’ propaganda campaigns. In
so doing both served important and strikingly similar roles as propaganda symbols and
symbolic figureheads of their revolts. In addition, to these similarities the larger bodies of
government, which not only supported each leader but also crafted and distributed a great
deal of the revolutionary propaganda themselves, acted in strikingly similar ways. Both
the British Parliament and the American Continental Congress, in conjunction with
Washington and William, had a huge hand in the spread of revolutionary propaganda
through official declarations (many of which were printed as newspaper articles),
pamphlets, letters, speeches and petitions.
Eventually this propaganda enabled Washington, William, the Congress and the
Parliament to take on the roles normally reserved for a legal government, despite the fact
that these revolutionaries in many ways lacked full legal legitimacy. This process
increased their ability to validate themselves in the eyes of their people and ultimately
enabled them to wield more authority in their revolutions.
Despite all these parallels, further differences can also be pulled from our study.
For instance, William, with the help of dedicated allies such as Gilbert Burnet, used the
pulpit of the Anglican Church to further extend his message and frame the conflict in
religious terms. This explicitly religious element of the Glorious Revolution is absent
from the American Revolution and while the American revolutionaries did indeed
successfully use religious language as part of their propaganda and frequently espoused
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the belief that God was on their side, they did not make a concerted national effort to
spread this message using American churches. While this dissimilarity may complicate a
comparison of these movements I believe in general it simply reinforces the fact that at
its core the Glorious Revolution was a far more religious conflict than the American
Revolution. Furthermore, I believe these points suggest that the American conflict was
motivated far more by political and philosophical issues rather than religious ones. In the
end, I do not believe these conclusions are surprising given the fact that if one examines
the initial goals and the rationale of these revolutionaries, William of Orange and his
supporters consistently saw their revolution as a religiously motivated one, while the
Continental Congress and George Washington always saw theirs as being far more
political and ideological.
Considering the questions posed at the very beginning of this study, I believe this
thesis has provided important information with regards to how propaganda is used in
revolution and how legitimacy is attained. In general my paper suggests that the forms of
propaganda which use religion, while also appealing to political and ideological
principles have the best chance of success. This appears to be true even in very different
types of revolutions which may be fought for religious or political reasons. While some
may have a problem labeling all of the tactics I have discussed in this essay as
“propaganda” I believe that we should adopt a more fluid understanding of the term so
that readers are not immediately overwhelmed by its use and do not immediately equate
the works o f Stalin with those of someone like Washington. In the end I think we should
become more comfortable with the concept of propaganda and accept its prevalence and
its power, especially in our own time. Finally, I believe that while we may never know
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why some revolutions succeed and others do not, I believe we can all agree that a
carefully orchestrated, well crafted, and diverse propaganda campaign is essential for any
group of revolutionaries no matter when they fight or the purpose of their movement.
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IV. Epilogue: Propaganda and the Memory o f Revolution

Celebrated eighteenth-century English politician and philosopher Henry St John,
the 1st Viscount Bolingbroke, once said that “history is philosophy teaching by
examples.”

107

This sentiment remains important even to today’s historians who strive to

have their works be instructive, inspirational, and yet free from any damaging bias or
subjectivity. Even today, however, as Jack Rakove has stated, “the ideal of ‘unbiased’
history remains an elusive goal.”

1 /\Q

This problem of objectivity has long plagued even the

most evenhanded of scholars. Despite the utmost attention to detail and attempts at
impartiality, all historians interject their own beliefs and personal preconceptions into
every project they undertake. I have always been intrigued by the nature of this problem
and its connections to our accounts of various revolutions and revolutionary propaganda.
After all, the historians of Lord Bolingbroke’s era were much less concerned with
objectivity. Older histories were written in order to advance beliefs which the historian,
or others with influence around them, believed were most important. Bias was accepted
and even encouraged, especially with regards to the history’s more significant figures.
William Gordon, a noted eighteenth-century American historian, believed that it was his
responsibility to “oblige all, who have performed any distinguished part on the theatre of
the world, to appear before us in their proper character; and to render an account at the
tribunal of posterity, as models which ought to be followed or as examples to be censured

107 Issac Kramnick, ed., Lord Bolingbroke: Historical Writings, (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press,
1973), xvi; this quotation is also attributed to Thucydides in his The History o f the Peloponnesian War in
various sources.
108 Jack Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making o f the Constitution (New York: A. A.
Knopf, 1996), 6.
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or avoided.”109 It is no surprise therefore that the histories of the famous leaders o f the
Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution were stunted according to the interests
of the historians of their time. In fact, even one hundred or two hundred years after the
events which made them famous, an objective account o f King William and George
Washington was still not even being attempted.
While most descriptions of the Prince of Orange’s landing at Torbay attest to the
grand scale of the enterprise and the general importance of the event, perhaps no account
captures the scene with as much vivid imagery, beautiful prose, and unabashed
partisanship as Thomas Babington Macaulay’s massive, multi-volume The History o f
England from the Accession o f James II, originally published in 1840. The author relates
the story of the landing with a truly dramatic flair. After a dreary mist had initially
prevented the fleet from coming ashore, Macaulay states that suddenly “a soft breeze
sprang up from the south,” allowing the sun to break through and light the way for the
prince’s arrival.110 Coming ashore uncontested William and his entourage immediately
mounted their horses and began to review the countryside. Nearby, peasants were said to
marvel at the sight and immediately flocked to the prince’s banner since all “held Popery
in detestation.”111 The prince himself was said to be in high spirits and extremely hopeful
for the rest of the expedition. Marching through the nearby town of Exeter four days later
he was met by a huge crowd of supporters who, having never seen a sight such as this
before, came “half a day’s journey to meet the champion of their religion.”

112

Overcome

109 William Gordon, The History o f the Rise, Progress and Establishment o f the Independence o f the United
States, (London, 1788), i.
110 T.B. Macaulay, History o f England from the Accession o f James 11 (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1849-61), 2:444.
111 Ibid., 445.
112 Ibid., 449.
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with “delight and awe,” spectators crowded into every door, window balcony and roof
and “gaily decorated” their houses.113 On the prince’s banners, according to Macaulay,
the words “The Liberties of England and the Protestant religion I will maintain,” were
prominently printed.114
Considering the good fortune with which they had proceeded on their journey
many members of the expedition were thoroughly convinced that “the ordinary laws of
nature” had been “suspended for the preservation of the liberty and religion of
England.”115 The weather had cooperated at every turn, helping the Dutch fleet reach the
shore while frustrating the pursuit of the prince’s enemies. This reminded many of the
men of the destruction of the Spanish Armada a hundred years before. In addition, the
fact that the landing had taken place on the anniversary of the failure of “the blackest plot
ever devised by papists,” The Gunpowder Plot, only added to the increased feeling of
confidence among the troops.116 Throughout the ranks there was an understanding that
what was transpiring was a special event that would usher in a new period of greatness
for the English nation.
Only a few years later a no more objective account of General George
Washington’s arrival in Cambridge, Massachusetts would be presented by one of
America’s first great authors and historians: Washington Irving. In his The Life o f George
Washington, originally published in 1855, Irving paints his subject’s life in vivid detail.
According to the writer, the General’s procession into the town was full of pomp and
circumstance. “As he entered the camp,” states the author “the shouts o f the multitude

1,3 Ibid., 450.
114 Ibid.; 450-451.
115 Ibid., 448.
116 Ibid.
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and the thundering of the artillery gave note to the enemy beleaguered in Boston of his
arrival.”117 The General’s appearance was “calculated to captivate the public eye,” and he
was “the admiration of the soldiery and of a throng collected from the surrounding
countryside.” 118 In the midst of all of this revelry Washington, it is said, remained
“modest at all times.”119 “The honors with which he was received, the acclamations of the
public, the cheerings of the army, only told him how much was expected of him.”120
The following morning Washington took formal command of the army and began
by reviewing his troops and their lines on horseback, slowly beginning the task of turning
his inexperienced yet faithful army into a capable fighting force. When faced with such a
challenge the General is said to have acted with “that solemn resolution and that hopeful
reliance on Supreme Goodness which belonged to his magnanimous nature.”

191

Other

subsequent accounts and works o f art continue to embellish the scene, picturing
Washington saluting his troops on horseback before taking cover under an elm tree. The
tree for years afterwards would affectionately be known as the “Washington Elm” and
would be marked by a plaque which can still be found there today.
The rampant inaccuracies of both accounts expose not only the bias of the
histories of the past and the general challenge to the historian but also the enduring power
of the propaganda of revolution. In reality, Washington’s entrance into Cambridge was
anything but a glorious scene.
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The general and his entourage arrived in the town on a

wet and dreary afternoon. There were no crowds of soldiers there to greet the group, no
117 Washington Irving, The Life o f George Washington, (Tarrytown, N.Y.: Sleepy Hollow Restorations,
1975), 122.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid., 123.

122 Fred W. Anderson, “The Hinge o f Revolution: George Washington Confronts a People’s Army, July 3,
1775,” Massachusetts Historical Review, vol. 1 (1999): 21-48, 22.
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shouts of joy, and no cannons firing.123 In fact the only individuals actually there to
witness his entrance were some idlers wandering through the town, most likely from the
nearby college of Harvard. While a contingent of troops had initially planned on greeting
Washington, the time of his arrival was not definitively known and thus when the men
assembled a day earlier and were frustrated to find that the General had not yet arrived,
they did not return the next day for fear of a similar disappointment.124 When they did
finally meet their new commander many of the troops were apparently unimpressed with
him.125
Similarly, William’s landing and the beginning of his march, while it must have
\

been an impressive scene, could not have been as momentous an occasion as the
description given by Macaulay would have us believe. As later historians are quick to
point out, such fanciful accounts are careful to leave out “the drizzling, chilly rain, the
mud, the steep hills, and the narrow, rocky roads that were little better than footpaths; or
the grim undercurrent of fear that gripped a people caught between a powerful invading
army and the orders of their King that any communication or commerce with it were
treason or death.”126
While Washington and William may very well appear before us here in their
“proper” character, serving as models for countless others to emulate, as our study has
shown, their true nature was far more complicated and decidedly not as “glorious” as
they would have us see. Thus, I bel ieve we must never forget that history itself has served

Freeman, 477.
124 Ibid.
125 Lengel, General George Washington: A Military Life, 106.
126 Lucile Pinkham, William 111 and the Respectable Revolution: The Part Played by William o f Orange in
the Revolution o f 1688 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 152.
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as a form of propaganda, with historians picking up where the revolutionary
propagandists left off.
If one desires further proof of this they need only consider the ideological origins
of the American Revolution and its links to the popular Whig interpretation of the
Glorious Revolution. Thanks to the efforts of historians such as Macaulay the Glorious
Revolution, and in particular the English Bill of Rights of 1689, was viewed as “a
formative stage in the development o f liberal democracy.”127 By linking the revolution
with the works of John Locke and in particular his Two Treatises o f Government which
was first published in the aftermath of the movement, historians credited King William
III and his Parliament for having “nurtured the growth of freedom and liberty among the
English people.”

no

In reality, however, Locke’s work was not a product of the revolution

and exerted little to no influence over it, a fact which is not too surprising when one
considers the reasons for William’s invasion of England and his rationale for claiming the
throne. In fact, William himself, following the issuance of the Declaration o f Rights
denied any formal connection between his acceptance of the throne and his acceptance of
the terms of the bill.129
Nevertheless, despite these false links, the American revolutionary generation
looked to the Bill of Rights of 1689 and indeed the Glorious Revolution itself as a
formative event and adapted its language for their fight against King George. George
Mason’s Virginia Declaration o f Rights lifts entire sections out of the English Bill of

127
128
129

Hoak, 2.
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Rights while elements the American Constitution of 1789 can also be said to resemble the
1689 document.130
All of these facts I believe only reinforce the power of the propaganda of the
Glorious Revolution and American Revolution, propaganda which this thesis has
attempted to compare and discuss in detail. No matter the academic application of this
modest essay I nevertheless believe the information presented in it demonstrates the
power of revolutionary persuasion. These revolutionaries not only influenced their own
populations and used their arguments to attain legitimacy for their governments, they
influenced countless generations after them and no doubt created arguments that allowed
future revolutionaries to successfully revolt. If we take one thing away from this study, it
should be that the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution were successful
because of their propaganda; propaganda which had a profound effect upon subsequent
revolutions and continues to have an enormous effect on us even today.

130 Ibid., 3.
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